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In his book The politics of the police, the British 
police scholar, Robert Reiner, makes the point that 
‘the police are marginal to the control of crime 
and disorder’ while ‘public peace and security are 
primarily a function of deeper processes in political 
economy and culture’.1 He argues that indulging in 
what he calls ‘police fetishism’ – the assumption 
that the police are the ‘thin blue line’ that preserves 
society from dissolving into a state of violent chaos 
– is implicit in most if not all public discussion of 
policing, and a good deal of academic writing on the 
subject too.2  
It is also widely recognised that their relationship with 
the public – the people who are policed as well as 
those on whose behalf policing is done – is critical 
to everything that the police do. This view is shared 
by observers whose perspectives on policing differ 
sharply in other respects. Thus the ‘broken windows’ 
theorists George L Kelling and James Q Wilson 
emphasised that scarce police resources need to be 
deployed to support citizens in neighbourhoods at 
‘the tipping point’ where public order is ‘deteriorating 
but not unreclaimable’.3 Herman Goldstein, the 
founding father of problem-oriented policing, 
insisted that the police should focus on problems 
identified by the communities they serve, and seek 
to mobilise the public in resolving them.4 Writing in 
1979 as an Assistant Commissioner of London’s 
Metropolitan Police, John Alderson argued that 
providing ‘leadership and participation in dispelling 
criminogenic social conditions through co-operative 
social action’ was one of 10 objectives for police in a 
free society.5  
Similar considerations are relevant at a societal level. 
Looking forward to the post-apartheid era in South 
Africa in 1994, John Brewer argued that the legacy of 
oppressive colonial policing could not be overcome in 
the absence of a wider process of social change. ‘No 
amount of police reform’ would, he wrote, ‘alter the 
nature of police-public relations’ unless the ‘structural 
inequalities and problems of South African society’ 
were addressed.6
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Only rarely do inquiries into policing investigate the social context within which it takes place. This article 
looks at two inquiries that chose to take on this task: Lord Scarman’s into the Brixton disorders in London 
in April 1981; and Justice Kate O’Regan and Advocate Vusi Pikoli’s into the current state of policing in 
Khayelitsha in the Western Cape. It argues that they should be applauded for doing so, but draws attention 
to how difficult it can be to persuade governments to address the deep-rooted social and economic 
problems associated with crises in policing rather than focus on reforming the police institution, its policies, 
procedures and practices. 
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There is then a large measure of agreement over the 
need to recognise three things: the limitations of the 
police (and, to be more specific, the public police) as 
guarantors of order in the face of social forces well 
beyond their control; the centrality of the relationship 
between the police and the public to effective 
policing; and the urgency of social and economic 
change if meaningful police reform is to be achieved. 
So it is surprising how rarely inquiries into policing 
take account of the social context within which 
policing is done, and attend to the social conditions 
that gave rise to the issues the police have been 
charged with investigating.  
Case studies
The purpose of this article is to look at the work 
of the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of 
Policing Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations 
between SAPS and the Community of Khayelitsha 
(‘O’Regan/Pikoli’), which attempted to do this,7 and 
to compare its efforts to set policing in its social 
context with those of the inquiry into the Brixton 
disorders conducted by Lord Scarman in 1981 
(‘Scarman’).8 These two inquiries have been chosen 
as case studies because, though they took place 
over 30 years apart and focused on policing in cities 
(Cape Town and London) on different continents in 
countries (South Africa and the United Kingdom) with 
contrasting, if overlapping, histories, they have much 
in common. Both were set up in response to what 
seemed to be a chronic breakdown in trust between 
police and policed (albeit with more or less acute 
symptoms); and both were led by senior members 
of the judiciary (one a recently retired judge of South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court, the other a serving 
member of what was until 2009 his country’s highest 
court, the House of Lords).  
Scarman was asked to inquire into three days of 
public disorder on the streets of inner city London in 
which 279 police officers and at least 45 members 
of the public were injured; O’Regan/Pikoli into 
complaints of inefficiency and a breakdown in 
relations between the community and the police in 
what apartheid-era administrators liked to call a ‘high 
density township’. Both inquiries decided to set the 
policing issues they had been asked to consider 
in their social context. O’Regan/Pikoli devote one 
of their report’s 15 chapters to ‘understanding the 
context of Khayelitsha’; parts II and VI of 
Scarman’s nine-part equivalent are concerned with 
‘social conditions’ and ‘the disorders and social 
policy’ respectively.  
The approach adopted by O’Regan/Pikoli, and by 
Scarman, can be contrasted with the narrower scope 
of inquiries into the fatal consequences of events at 
the Marikana platinum mine in South Africa’s North 
West province in August 2012 and the death of the 
black teenager Stephen Lawrence on the streets 
of Eltham in south London on 22 April 1993.9 The 
Marikana Commission of Inquiry, chaired by a retired 
judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Ian Farlam, 
noted the ‘squalid’ conditions prevailing in Nkaneng 
and other informal settlements around the mine, but 
was more concerned with a forensic dissection of 
the mine owner’s obligations to provide housing to its 
workers under the terms of a legally binding ‘social 
and labour plan’ than with detailed analysis of the 
workers’ circumstances and what might be done to 
improve them.10 Though it identified ‘institutionalised 
racism’ (of which more below) as an important factor 
in the Metropolitan Police Service’s mishandling of 
the investigation of his death, the Stephen Lawrence 
Inquiry (also led by a retired judge) has been criticised 
by one well-placed observer for failing ‘to place [the 
murder] in the broader historical context of black/
police relations’ and disconnecting it from ‘the local 
contexts of racial violence’.11 
Commissions of inquiry
Part of the explanation for this unwillingness to 
explore the social context of policing may lie in the 
nature of commissions of inquiry, defined by Raanan 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan as time-limited institutions external 
to the executive but set up by a government or a 
minister at her/his/its discretion and charged with 
the principal task of investigating past events.12 
At times of crises, he suggests, inquiries are seen 
as ‘possessing the unique capacity to provide an 
impartial assessment, and bring certainty and closure 
in situations of doubt and conflict’.13 They serve as 
‘instruments of accountability and policy learning’.14 
But, in doing so, they represent a threat to politicians 
playing a ‘high-stake game of political survival’ in 
which avoiding blame for the event or crisis under 
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investigation may be as urgent a priority as finding 
out what happened, or making sure that it does not 
happen again.15  
For the pragmatic politician establishing an inquiry 
into an aspect of policing, the advantage of limiting 
its scope to the police – a bureaucratic organisation 
staffed by a disciplined body of public servants – may 
appear obvious. Deftly conducted by someone with 
a suitably safe pair of hands, an inquiry may serve to 
shift the focus of government policy from issues of 
social structure to what at least appears to be a less 
intractable set of problems to do with the direction 
and operations of the police. In this ideal world, the 
police can be both blamed for what went wrong and 
made responsible for putting things right. Without 
being too cynical about the motivations of those 
behind the O’Regan/Pikoli and Scarman inquiries, 
it is tempting to see this kind of thinking behind the 
terms of reference they were given, the way those 
mandates were interpreted and, more obviously in 
the case of Scarman, government’s response to 
their findings. The appointment, terms of reference, 
findings, recommendations and impact of these two 
inquiries are the subject matter of the next three 
sections of this article.
Appointment and terms of reference  
The background to the appointment of the O’Regan/
Pikoli and Scarman inquires has been referred to 
briefly above. A little more needs to be said at this 
point if their appointment and the task with which 
they were entrusted are to be understood.  
The O’Regan/Pikoli inquiry was appointed by Helen 
Zille, the Premier of the Western Cape, on 24 August 
2012 to investigate allegations of:
•	 Inefficiency	on	the	part	of	the	South	African	
 Police Service (SAPS) operating from the three 
police stations in Khayelitsha and in the area  
more generally
•	 A	breakdown	in	relations	between	the	Khayelitsha	
community and members of the SAPS16 
These allegations had been made by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) working in 
Khayelitsha. The NGOs referred to eight cases that 
illustrated the problems with policing in the area. 
They ranged from inadequacies in visible policing to 
shortcomings in the investigation of crime (particularly 
crime committed against foreign nationals, lesbian, 
gay, transgender and inter-sex [LGBTI] people 
and members of other vulnerable groups) and the 
response to specific policing challenges such as 
illegal liquor outlets, youth gangs, vigilantism and 
domestic and sexual violence.  
The commission was appointed under section 
1 of the Western Cape Provincial Commission 
Act 1988 (10 of 1988) and was intended to give 
effect to powers contained in section 206(3) of the 
Constitution, permitting provinces to, among other 
things, ‘oversee the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the police service’ (section (3)(b)) and ‘promote good 
relations between the police and the community’ 
(section (3)(c)).  The somewhat fractious relationship 
between the African National Congress (ANC) 
administration at national level and the opposition-
led government of the Western Cape, combined 
with the fact that, under the terms of section 206(1) 
of the Constitution, policing is primarily but not 
exclusively a national competence, meant that the 
commission’s appointment soon became mired in 
political and legal wrangling. The dispute between the 
two levels of government was only resolved when the 
Constitutional Court ruled that: 
[W]hilst a province has no control over the 
policing function, it has a legitimate interest that 
its residents are shielded from crime and that 
they enjoy the protection of effective, efficient 
and visible policing.18   
It was common ground between the parties to 
the case that, under section 206(5), establishing a 
commission of inquiry was a constitutionally 
proper way of pursuing that interest and O’Regan 
and Pikoli were eventually permitted to complete 
their investigation.19 
What is important to note from this is that O’Regan/
Pikoli’s mandate was derived from constitutional 
provisions that relate specifically and exclusively to 
the police. They were not asked to conduct a more 
broadly based inquiry into whether residents of 
Khayelitsha were being afforded the socio-economic 
rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (the 
Bill of Rights) relating to housing (section 26), health 
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care, food, water and social security (section 27) and 
education (section 29).  
Equally significant is the question of political 
responsibility for the police, and where the blame 
for any shortcomings in their performance would lie.  
The effect of sections 205–207 of the Constitution, 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Minister 
of Police and Others v Premier Western Cape and 
Others, is that national government in the shape 
of the minister of police ‘must determine national 
policing policy’ (section 206(1)). The national 
commissioner appointed by the president must then 
exercise control over, and manage the police service 
in accordance with that policy (section 207(1) and 
(2)). From the point of view of the premier of the 
Western Cape, most, if not all, of the blame for any 
crisis in policing in Khayelitsha that O’Regan/Pikoli 
might find would lie with her opponents in the ANC, 
and the national minister of police in particular. A 
wider ranging investigation into social conditions for 
which the provincial government could also be held 
responsible might prove more awkward, but for the 
premier, establishing an inquiry into policing must 
have seemed a relatively safe political bet. 
The constitutional and political background to the 
appointment of Scarman’s inquiry into the Brixton 
disorders of 10 and 12 April 1981 could hardly be 
more different. The disorders took place almost two 
years after the election in May 1979, with a majority 
of 43 seats in the House of Commons, of the first 
Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher. 
As Scarman himself acknowledged in his report, 
1981 was a time of ‘general economic recession’ 
and the polling company, Ipsos MORI, records 
that, in March of that year, the month preceding the 
Brixton disorders, public satisfaction with Thatcher’s 
government was at its lowest ebb.20 Britain’s 
famously unwritten constitution and highly centralised 
system of government made it almost inevitable 
that her government would sustain some political 
damage resulting from an inquiry into the disorders, 
particularly insofar as the social effects of its radical 
economic policies were implicated in the origins of 
the disturbances. It may well have been that, by 
indulging in what Sulitzeanu-Kenan calls a ‘venue 
alteration exercise’, replacing a more volatile critical 
audience (the media, opposition politicians and the 
public) with the more predictable one of a judge-led 
inquiry, the government was merely choosing the 
lesser of two evils.21  
The constitutional position was also relatively clear. 
Under arrangements unique to the Metropolitan 
Police, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, was 
responsible for policing in London not just as the 
government minister responsible for the police 
nationally, but also as the local police authority for 
the Metropolitan Police District. These arrangements 
were to be hotly debated throughout much of the 
next decade but, as things stood in 1981, political 
responsibility for policing in Brixton lay squarely 
with the home secretary. His response to events in 
Brixton was to establish an inquiry under section 
32 of the Police Act 1964, which provided that the 
home secretary ‘may cause a local inquiry to be 
held by a person to be appointed by him into any 
matter connected with the policing of any area’.22 
Scarman’s terms of reference were straightforward: 
‘to inquire into the serious disorder in Brixton on 
10 to 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power 
to make recommendations’.23 Though his inquiry 
was established under legislation providing for the 
governance of the police, he was invited, at least 
by implication, to range more widely in investigating 
the origins of the disorders. Unlike O’Regan/Pikoli, 
Scarman’s terms of reference made no explicit, 
and possibly constraining, references to the police 
institution. While the SAPS looms large in the 
mandate of the former, the Metropolitan Police is not 
mentioned in the appointment of the latter.  
Findings
Scarman’s response to this brief was bold.  He made 
the case for understanding policing in its social 
context in the introduction to his report in a passage 
that deserves to be quoted in full:
Policing policy and methods, it is obvious, reflect 
in part a reaction by lawfully constituted authority 
to the society which is being policed. A ‘Section 
32 inquiry’ is primarily concerned with policing 
but, because policing methods operate in and 
are influenced by the social situation, it cannot 
stop at policing. In this Inquiry, therefore, I have 
sought to identify not only the policing problem 
specific to the disorders but the social problem 
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of which it is necessarily part. The one cannot 
be understood or resolved save in the context 
of the other.24
Although they were no more responsible for the 
social and economic problems besetting the 
ethnically diverse communities that live in inner city 
areas such as Brixton than other citizens, the police 
had to ‘adjust their policies and operations ... with 
imagination as well as firmness’.25 If they did not, 
Scarman feared that ‘disorder [would] become a 
disease endemic in our society’.26
The profound and wide-ranging nature of Scarman’s 
concerns about social conditions in Brixton was 
evident throughout Part II of his report.27 As he 
described it, Brixton in 1981 was a once prosperous, 
now decaying, commercial and residential centre 
with very serious housing problems and a lack of 
recreational facilities appropriate to the needs of 
young people forced into the idleness that goes with 
unemployment.28 The people of Brixton were more 
likely to be young, working class and transient than 
in either the rest of London or in the London Borough 
of Lambeth, the local authority area of which Brixton 
formed (and still forms) part.29 They were more likely 
to be members of a one-parent family and to suffer 
from mental illness or have a mental or physical 
disability.30 Finally, and perhaps most significantly for 
the debate that swirled around the disorders and 
Scarman’s response to them, Brixton was one of the 
most ethnically diverse parts of London: 36% of the 
population of its five council wards was ‘non-white’, 
rising to 49% in two of them.31 Moreover, in the 
two wards at the centre of the disturbances, black 
people of West Indian or African origin formed 30% 
of the total population, but as many as 40% of 
0–18 year olds and 50% of those between the ages 
of 19 and 21.32
Scarman offered a stark analysis of the state 
of the black community in Brixton, leading one 
critical commentator to accuse him of adopting a 
‘pathological approach’ and downplaying the impact 
of both police and societal racism.33 In summary, 
he found that British social conditions had fractured 
the extended matriarchal structure of the West 
Indian family, leading to high proportions of children 
finding themselves either in local authority care or in 
households headed by a lone parent.34 Young black 
people had been failed by the education system and 
lacked the language and other basic skills needed 
to find work in a technological age.35 Combined with 
the effects of the ‘general economic recession’ and 
a ‘contraction in the economic and industrial base of 
the inner city’, this meant that young people generally, 
and black youth in particular, faced unemployment, 
often for long periods.36
With the benefit of hindsight, Scarman’s most 
controversial finding was that, though young black 
people experienced (mainly indirect) discrimination by 
employers in the workplace and elsewhere, Britain 
was not ‘an institutionally racist society’ – at least 
if that phrase was taken to mean that it was one 
that ‘knowingly, as a matter of policy, discriminates 
against black people’.37 Summing up, Scarman found 
that the black community in Brixton faced similar 
problems to those of their white neighbours.38 But 
they were more severe and were exacerbated by 
racial discrimination.39
As a result, young black people may feel a 
particular sense of frustration and deprivation. 
Spending much of their lives on the street, 
they are there bound to come into contact with 
criminals and with the police.40
The police appeared to many young black people 
‘as the visible symbols of the authority of a society 
which has failed to bring them its benefits or do 
them justice’.41 His conclusions on the nature of the 
disorders flowed from this:
The disorders were communal disturbances 
arising from a complex political, social and 
economic situation ...  There was a strong racial 
element in the disorders, but they were not a 
race riot. The riots were essentially an outburst 
of anger and resentment by young people 
against the police.42
O’Regan/Pikoli made much less of their efforts to 
contextualise policing in Khayelitsha. Instead of 
explicitly asserting that problems in policing can only 
be seen as part of a much more extensive set of 
social problems, they assumed that an understanding 
of context is essential to the successful completion of 
their inquiry. The sub-headings in the chapter of their 
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report on ‘understanding the context of Khayelitsha’ 
give an indication of the issues they considered: 
geography, history, demographics, social and 
economic conditions and, finally, crime.43  
The picture of Khayelitsha that emerges is of a place 
that has varying levels of disadvantage. It is home to 
almost half a million people, over half of whom live 
in informal dwellings.44 Ethnically and linguistically 
homogenous – 98.7% of residents surveyed for the 
2011 census described themselves as black/African; 
89.8% spoke isiXhosa at home – over two-thirds of 
adults had been born in the Eastern Cape.45 In some 
of the newer settlements this proportion rose to over 
four in five.46 Well over a quarter of the population 
was under the age of 15.47 On average, Khayelitsha 
residents had completed no more than nine years of 
schooling and less than 5% had a tertiary educational 
qualification.48 Over 50% of young men up to the 
age of 23 were unemployed and three-quarters of 
all households had incomes that meant they were 
unable to meet the cost of food and sustain the 
necessities of life.49 The number of households in 
Khayelitsha with on-site access to electricity, water 
and a toilet doubled between 1996 and 2011, but 
sanitation and street lighting remained especially 
contentious issues.50 In spite of a small drop in crime 
rates per capita since 2003/4, the commission 
concluded that levels of crime made it unsurprising 
that ‘a very high proportion of residents in Khayelitsha 
feel unsafe.’51  
In short, ‘[deep] levels of poverty, poor levels of 
infrastructure and very high crime rates’ made 
policing Khayelitsha ‘profoundly challenging’; it 
was, the commission found, ‘a particularly difficult 
place for [the] SAPS to operate [in]’.52 If social and 
economic conditions provided the background 
to the many inefficiencies in policing identified in 
their report, O’Regan/Pikoli traced the roots of the 
breakdown in relations between the SAPS and 
members of the community of Khayelitsha back 
to its fiercely contested development in the final 
days of apartheid.53 The SAPS’s predecessor, the 
South African Police, had been deeply implicated in 
pursuing the goals of apartheid, including controlling 
the ‘influx’ of people from the rural Eastern Cape, and 
fostering the violence that surrounded the creation of 
their ‘new home’ outside Cape Town.54 
This history imposes a particular burden on 
SAPS to demonstrate its fairness, even-
handedness and respect for the residents 
of Khayelitsha in order to win the trust of the 
community. Unlike in other parts of the world, 
SAPS cannot draw on a reservoir of good will 
that historical acceptance of the legitimacy of 
police work creates.55
Recommendations and impact
The extent to which the reports of the two inquiries 
made recommendations in relation to the context 
of policing reflected the different approaches to 
presenting their findings. Scarman devoted Part VI 
of his report to ‘the disorders and social policy’. He 
began it by rehearsing why ‘recommendations about 
policing ... must embrace the wider social context in 
which [it] is carried out’ before going on to call for a 
more coordinated approach to tackling the problems 
of Britain’s inner cities, as well as measures to meet 
the housing, education and employment needs 
of ethnic minorities.56 He also recommended that 
‘positive action’ (defined as ‘special programmes in 
areas of acute deprivation’) be taken to address the 
problem of racial disadvantage.57  
Far-reaching though his proposals were in some 
respects, he was careful to avoid saying anything 
about the ‘scale of resources which should be 
devoted to inner city or ethnic minority needs’.58 
This, he said, was a matter for government and 
Parliament.59 Reflecting on the response to his report 
at a conference held a year after the riots in April 
1982, Scarman offered an upbeat, not to say bullish, 
assessment. His conclusion about the disturbances, 
having complicated political, social and economic 
roots quoted earlier had been accepted as ‘beyond 
challenge’ and had ‘become one of the unspoken 
assumptions upon which social and police reforms 
are discussed and promoted’.60 He was pleased with 
the government’s response to the needs of ethnic 
minorities, but disappointed by the continued lack 
of coordinated action on inner city problems and 
uncertain about the fate of his recommendation on 
positive action.61
Four years later, in 1986, at another conference 
held after more rioting in British cities the previous 
year, much of Scarman’s optimism had evaporated 
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and he was moved to agree with another speaker, 
Usha Prashar, that his social and economic 
recommendations had not been implemented.62 
As Stuart Hall commented over a decade later, 
Scarman’s findings were notable for breaking the 
‘prevailing law-and-order consensus’ over the origins 
of disorder, but the social and economic reforms he 
had proposed were ‘seriously out of key with the 
times and [had] triggered no significant political or 
policy response’.63 Worse still, though his advocacy 
of a community-oriented approach to policing had 
become the dominant philosophy of police leaders 
in England and Wales by the end of the 1980s, his 
findings on racism failed to stand the test of time and 
were flatly contradicted in the report of the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry published in 1999.64 This stated 
that institutional racism (defined as ‘the collective 
failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate 
and professional service to people because of their 
colour, culture, or ethnic origin’) existed not just in the 
Metropolitan Police Service and other police services, 
but in other institutions across Britain.65 
There is no equivalent to Part VI of Scarman’s 
response to the Brixton disorders in the report of the 
Khayelitsha Commission. The recommendations set 
out in Chapter 15 of O’Regan/Pikoli touch on some 
of the problems – vengeance killings and attacks, 
youth gangs, unlicensed liquor outlets and domestic 
violence – that make policing in the area so 
challenging. But their emphasis is very much on 
the style, organisation and delivery of police 
services by the SAPS: on committing to community 
policing, reviewing the deployment of human 
resources and adopting a model of policing based 
on procedural justice.  
Reaction to the O’Regan/Pikoli report after it was 
published on 25 August 2014 had been muted until 
shortly before the anniversary of its publication. Then, 
on 7 August 2015, Zille issued a statement giving 
vent to her frustration at what she evidently saw as 
the failure of the national Minister of Police, Nkosinathi 
Nhleko, to respond to it, and of the SAPS to sign a 
memorandum of understanding with the provincial 
Department of Community Safety (DoCS), clarifying 
their respective roles and responsibilities in relation to 
policing in Khayelitsha.66 Such a memorandum was, 
she said, essential to taking action on the majority of 
O’Regan/Pikoli’s recommendations, although progress 
had already been made on community policing forum 
(CPF) elections, providing training to their members, 
bringing civil society groups together to prevent 
vengeance attacks and creating awareness about 
crimes against women and children.67   
In her statement, Zille also announced that, having 
received no response to inquiries about the status 
of a ‘strictly confidential’ response to the Khayelitsha 
Commission’s work handed over by the National 
Commissioner of the SAPS, General Riah Phiyega at 
a meeting on 8 June, she would make the document 
available to the media and the public at large.68 This 
document, signed by Phiyega and dated 5 June 2015, 
but issued ‘by direction of the Minister of Police’, 
contains an uncompromising defence of the SAPS.69 
It criticises the commission for adding to negative 
public perceptions of the SAPS and dismisses its 
work as an unnecessary distraction: ‘The commission 
highlighted what was already known and buttress [sic] 
what the SAPS has been talking about all along and 
dealing with.’70 There is little evidence in the SAPS’s 
response thus far to suggest that either the bitterness 
surrounding the commission’s establishment has 
diminished with the passage of time, or that the ANC 
and national government are prepared to take sole 
responsibility for the social and economic conditions 
prevailing in Khayelitsha. On the contrary, Phiyega 
notes that,
[W]hile its mandate was only to investigate 
policing, the Commission also found that a lack 
of proper investment by the [opposition-run] 
City of Cape Town and the Provincial 
Government in infrastructure such as toilets, 
street lights and roads had made policing more 
difficult and increased residents [sic] vulnerability 
to violent crime.71
With the premier of the Western Cape and the national 
commissioner (with the minister, apparently, behind 
her) drawing their rhetorical daggers, the prospects 
for political consensus over the future of policing in 
Khayelitsha, and how the circumstances under which 
it takes place might be improved, appear bleak. Yet, 
if the response to Phiyega’s document drafted by the 
provincial DoCS is to be believed, relationships on 
the ground may be rather more productive than the 
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political war of words would imply, as progress is 
already being made by DoCS, the SAPS and other 
role-players in turning policing in Khayelitsha around.72 
Conclusion
The central argument of this article is that, as 
Scarman had done over 30 years before, O’Regan/
Pikoli acknowledged that problems in policing 
(whether they present as acute in the case of Brixton 
or chronic as in Khayelitsha) are only fathomable 
if they are set in their wider social context. The 
approaches adopted in the reports of the two 
inquiries differ: where Scarman emphasised the 
connection between social and economic conditions 
and policing as a, if not the, guiding principle of his 
work, O’Regan/Pikoli were more understated in their 
commitment to understanding the context of policing. 
This may well reflect differences in the salience of 
policing and the police institution in their respective 
terms of references, but it can also be surmised that 
these approaches owed something to the political 
conditions under which the inquiries were appointed. 
In the light of the reticence shown by other inquiries, 
set up under not dissimilar circumstances, the fact 
that both Scarman and O’Regan/Pikoli chose to 
address these issues at all is a testament to their 
willingness to seek explanations for poor policing 
beyond the actions of those responsible for delivering 
it, and to interpret their respective terms of reference 
in such a way as to permit them to do so.   
What emerged from both inquiries was that people 
who lack a significant stake in society and feel that 
they get little or nothing from the state are likely to 
lack the trust and confidence in its agents on which 
public policing in a democratic society depends. And, 
at times of crisis, when people’s only point of contact 
with the state may well be with the police – police that 
are seen as routinely acting against rather than for 
them – protests against the police and their actions 
become freighted with anger stemming from a much 
wider set of frustrations and resentments.  
Although he did not say so in quite so many words, 
Scarman implied that genuine and sustainable police 
reform was impossible if the conditions under which 
policing was done remained unchanged. Reading the 
conclusions reached by O’Regan/Pikoli on the long 
shadow cast by the history of Khayelitsha, and the 
extremely testing environment in which the SAPS 
currently operates, it is hard to see them disagreeing. 
Yet, if Scarman’s experience is anything to go by, 
persuading governments to rethink their economic 
and social policies is some way beyond the compass 
of any ad hoc body with a mandate limited to 
policing. The complexities of the constitutional and 
political situation in South Africa, with the opposition-
led City of Cape Town and Western Cape provincial 
government having appointed the O’Regan/Pikoli 
Commission against the wishes of the ANC, the 
SAPS and the national minister for police, make it 
unlikely that either side in an increasingly bitter war 
of words over its findings and recommendations will 
be anxious to tackle the contextual issues identified 
in their report. With political survival at stake, and 
the diktats of neo-liberalism so firmly implanted in 
the minds of early Thatcherite true-believers and 
more recent South African converts among the ANC 
and its political rivals in the Western Cape alike, the 
temptation to tinker with the police institution and 
scratch at the surface of the social problems to which 
it alone cannot offer a remotely adequate response 
becomes hard to resist.  
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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